Explaining Asset Prices with External Habits and Wage Rigidities in a DSGE Model.

In this paper, I investigate the scope of a model with exogenous habit formation - or `catching up with the Joneses`, see Abel (1990) - to generate the observed equity premium as well as other key macroeconomic facts. Along the way, I derive restrictions for four out of eight parameters for a rather general preference specification of habit formation by imposing consistency with long-run growth, the leisure share, the aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the observed risk-free rate, and the observed Sharpe ratio. I show that a DSGE model with (exogenous and lagged) habits in both leisure and consumption, but not necessarily with additional persistence, is well capable of matching the observed asset market facts as well as macro facts, provided one allows for moderate real wage stickiness and provided one allows for sufficient curvature on preferences, as dictated by the asset market observations. Without wage stickiness, delivery on both the asset pricing implications as well as the macroeconomic implications seems to be much harder.asset pricing, wage rigidity, habit formation, Frisch elasticity, Sharpe ratio, log-linear approximation

Discussion of "The Source of Historical Economic Fluctuations: An Analysis using Long-Run Restrictions" by Neville Francis and Valerie A. Ramey

This paper discusses the paper "The Source of Historical Economic Fluctuations: An Analysis using Long-Run Restrictions" by Neville Francis and Valerie A. Ramey. It argues that these authors have made great progress both in the precise measurement of labor input as well as determining the effect of productivity shocks on labor, but a number of questions remain. As for measurement, the issue of schooling needs further work. As for calculating the long-run impact of labor productivity shocks, unreasonable results emerge for the response of the capital stock, if included in the VAR. Using medium-term identification delivers more reasonable results.technological progress, business cycles, hours worked, labor productivity, vector autoregressions, identification, long-run restrictions, medium-run restrictions

Explaining Asset Prices with External Habits and Wage Rigidities in a DSGE Model.

In this paper, I investigate the scope of a model with exogenous habit formation - or `catching up with the Joneses`, see Abel (1990) - to generate the observed equity premium as well as other key macroeconomic facts. Along the way, I derive restrictions for four out of eight parameters for a rather general preference specification of habit formation by imposing consistency with long-run growth, the leisure share, the aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the observed risk-free rate, and the observed Sharpe ratio. I show that a DSGE model with (exogenous and lagged) habits in both leisure and consumption, but not necessarily with additional persistence, is well capable of matching the observed asset market facts as well as macro facts, provided one allows for moderate real wage stickiness and provided one allows for sufficient curvature on preferences, as dictated by the asset market observations. Without wage stickiness, delivery on both the asset pricing implications as well as the macroeconomic implications seems to be much harder.asset pricing, wage rigidity, habit formation, Frisch elasticity, Sharpe ratio, log-linear approximation

Did the Fed Surprise the Markets in 2001? A Case Study for VARs with Sign Restrictions

In 2001, the Fed has lowered interest rates in a series of cuts, starting from 6.5 per cent at the end of 2000 to 2.0 per cent by early November. This paper asks, whether the Federal Reserve Bank has been surprising the markets, taking as given the conventional view about the effect of monetary policy shocks. New econometric techniques turn out to be particularly suitable for answering this question: this paper can be viewed as a showcase and case study for their application. In order to concentrate on the Greenspan period, a vector autoregression is fitted to US data, starting in 1986 and ending in September 2001. Monetary policy shocks are identified, using the new sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1999), imposing the "conventional view" that contractionary policy shocks lead to a rise in interest rates and declines in nonborrowed reserves, prices and output. We find that neither the Fed policy choices in 2001 nor those of 2000 were surprising. We provide a method to "explain" these interest rate movements by decomposing them into their sources. Finally, we argue that constant-interest-rate projections like those popular at many central banks are of limited informational value, can be highly misleading, and should instead be replaced by on-the-equilibrium-path projections.monetary policy; vector autoregression; sign restriction; identification; 2001, September 11th

How far are we from the slippery slope? The Laffer curve revisited

We characterize the Laffer curves for labor taxation and capital income taxation quantitatively for the US, the EU-14 and individual European countries by comparing the balanced growth paths of a neoclassical growth model featuring ”constant Frisch elasticity” (CFE) preferences. We derive properties of CFE preferences. We provide new tax rate data. For benchmark parameters, we find that the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising labor taxes and 6% by raising capital income taxes. For the EU-14 we obtain 8% and 1%. Denmark and Sweden are on the wrong side of the Laffer curve for capital income taxation. JEL Classification: E0, E60, H0dynamic scoring, incentives, Laffer curve, US and EU-14 economy

What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?

We propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions. Unlike most of the previous literature this approach does not require that the contemporaneous reaction of some variables to fiscal policy shocks be set to zero or need additional information, such as the timing of wars, in order to identify fiscal policy shocks. The paper's method is a purely vector autoregressive approach which can be universally applied. The approach also has the advantages that it is able to model the effects of announcements of future changes in fiscal policy and that it is able to distinguish between the changes in fiscal variables caused by fiscal policy shocks and those caused by business cycle and monetary policy shocks. We apply the method to US quarterly data from 1955-2000 and obtain interesting results. Our key finding is that the best fiscal policy to stimulate the economy is a deficit-financed tax cut and that the long term costs of fiscal expansion through government spending are probably greater than the short term gains.Fiscal Policy, Vector Autoregression, Bayesian Econometrics, Agnostic identification

Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. Contrary to intuition, we demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff (1989). From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.